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Szabo’s purpose is not to provide the general reader a definitive account of 
early Greek science but to elaborate for the specialist a program of research and a 
few preliminary conclusions. His method is presented in light of two consider- 
ations: the fact that translations may be sound overall and convey the mathemati- 
cal sense of a text, but may still fail in matters of detail because they mislead as to 
the proper sense of words and their history; and the fact that, because direct 
evidence of pre-Euclidean mathematics is scarce, any reconstruction of the sci- 
ence of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. must rely on the indirect testimony of 
later sources. Since scientific concepts and the language expressing them change 
with time, Szabo advocates a philological or linguistic study of later scientific 
terminology as a means to elucidate the concepts basic to earlier science. There 
are, of course, many species of philology, and it is clear from what Szabo says and 
from what he does that he understands something akin to etymology, that he is not 
concerned so much with the circumstantial history of terms as with their meanings 
as signified by their formation (pp. 15-24). The danger in this is the temptation to 
supplant what is written with a theory of what the words used must mean, to 
prefer one’s reconstructions of sense to the evidence of the text and even to 
project them into the text. For some, this danger will seem magnified by Szabo‘s 
refusal to take into account the influence of pre-Greek mathematics (pp. 30-32). 
In fact, Szabo succumbs at least once, I think, to the allure of his philology and 
perverts the scientific testimony he uses to establish his position (see below on 
Part 2). Yet, so far as it is worthwhile to distinguish the method Szabo proclaims 
and what he actually does, one should observe that Szabo’s story is an etymologi- 
cal tale of concepts which are supposed to evolve from the simple to the more 
complex, and that he offers no reason to think that intellectual history and the 
development of linguistic usage are properly or even fruitfully said to proceed in 
this way. Such a story may initially seem attractive, but this, I suspect, is due not 
to any inherent plausibility but to the scarcity of evidence by which to test it. 
Would the etymological method prove credible were Szabo to concentrate on the 
development of mathematics from the time of Newton to the present? 
In the Introduction, Szabo states two main conclusions of his research: (i) that 
the theory of odd and even number and the systematic organization of Euclidean 
arithmetic were accomplishments of the very early fifth century, and (ii) that the 
discoveries attributed to Theodorus and Theaetetus on the strength of Plato’s 
Theaetetus probably antedate Hippocrates of Chios (ca. 470-400 B.C.). These 
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conclusions are part of an account of the development of early Greek mathemati- 
cal science in which Szab6 discerns three stages or problem situations. First, 
there was the musical theory of proportion. Initially, this theory was character- 
ized by experimentation on a monochord without measuring rod, by the use of 
technical terms for certain intervals or diastcmata (i.e., “diplasion,” “hemi- 
oiion, ’ ’ and “epitriton”), and by the introduction of the method of reciprocal 
subtraction (antanairesis, anthyphairesis) which is now called the Euclidean al- 
gorithm. Later, it advanced with the innovation of a measuring rod divided into 
twelve intervals and the development of the concept of logos as a relation of two 
numbers. In the second stage, the musical theory of proportion was applied to 
arithmetic in the geometrized study of plane numbers and of similar plane num- 
bers. In the third and final stage, the theory of proportions was extended further to 
geometry in the study of similar rectilinear figures, the development of constructive 
techniques for determining mean proportionals, and the use of ratios of arbitrary 
quantities (pp. 24-30). 
SzaM’s argument is developed in three sections. I shall discuss each in order, 
prefacing my comments with a report of its contents. 
Part 1 (pp. 33-98) is intended to show that linear incommensurability was 
discovered in the study of how a rectangle (and, hence, any plane rectilinear area) 
can be transformed into a square of equal area. A critical part of Szab6’s case 
rests on his analysis of the term “dynamis.” In his view, the dynamis of a rectan- 
gle is the square into which it is transformed or the value of this square. Such 
usage, he claims, though peculiar to mathematics, has its origins in finance, where 
the dynamis of money is its value in other coinage, and in the use of “dynasthai” 
to mean “to be worth, ” “to have the value of,” “ to amount to” (pp. 36-40, 44- 
46). Szab6 next introduces three theses: that the concept of a dynamis arose in 
connection with the problem of squaring (tetrag&zismos); that the problem of 
squaring is really one of finding a mean proportional; and that Euclid, Elem. viii 
18,20 (two numbers have a mean proportional if and only if they are similar plane 
numbers) antedates the construction of the mean proportional found in Elem. vi 13 
which is, in turn, prior to that of ii 14. Thus, he proposes that Greek mathemati- 
cians originally distinguished rectangles and t&rag&a sche^mata (quadrangular 
figures, i.e., squares), there being no need to introduce a new name for the squares 
into which rectangles defined by similar numbers could be transformed since all 
these rectangles are perfect squares. The discovery of the general method of 
constructing a mean proportional of two lines, however, changed the picture. 
First, it raised the problem of linear incommensurability: all squares equivalent to 
number-rectangles whose sides are not similar plane numbers have sides which 
are not numbers at all. Second, it may have led to calling these squares dynameis 
in contradistinction to those squares which are equal to the product of two similar 
plane numbers (pp. 46-54). 
To establish this history, Szabd turns to Plato, Theaetetus 147c-148b. Since the 
general results of his analysis of this passage are by now well known, and, since 
they have been subject to careful scrutiny elsewhere [Burnyeat 19781, I shall only 
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reiterate Szab6’s finding that the Platonic text (which he argues is the source of 
much of the tradition about the early study of incommensurability) does not 
indicate any concepts, terms, or proofs, which can be attributed to either 
Theodorus or Theaetetus (pp. 55-86). The discussion of the early history of 
incommensurability concludes with a series of conjectures. Szab6 proposes that 
the discovery of the incommensurability of the side and diagonal of a square arose 
because geometers were interested in doubling the square; that the problem of 
doubling a square is the same as that of finding a mean proportional between a 
number and its double; that the discovery of incommensurability occasioned (i) 
the distinction of lines expressible (rh&tai) and inexpressible (arre^tai) as whole 
numbers, and later (ii) the conception of lines incommensurable in length but 
commensurable in dynarnis, that is, when squared (pp. 86-98). Beyond observing 
that doubling the square is a special case of fetrugbzismos, Szab6 does not elabo- 
rate the relation between this set of conjectures and his account of “dynumis,” 
that is, between the two versions of the discovery of linear incommensurability. 
Instead, he points to the prominence of the problem of the mean proportional, 
suggests that the problem of irrationality originated in the pre-Euclidean theory of 
proportions, and turns to this. 
In considering Part 1, the reader will be struck by Szab6’s claim that his analysis 
of Plato, Theuetetus 147c-148b stands as a test piece of his method. For there is, 
regrettably, an unseemly gap between the description of the method and its appli- 
cation. To begin, the translation lacks precision. Szab6’s renderings of 
KLVZ~U~E~ELF Z’~OT&V (147~8) and ~)I$EG-E (147e2) are questionable but minor, as is 
perhaps his assumption that TGV dLp~i+b &vra at 147e5 ff. means “all numbers” 
rather than “all number.” But more serious is his neglect of the demonstrative 
rc&(~s at 147el. Read properly, the text shows that Theaetetus regards ull 
squares as dynumeis, and so envisages a division of dynumeis into those that are 
not the products of equal factors (cf. &a~ T&~(YF . . . r&s &W&LELF) and those 
that are: cf. 147d7-8, which more naturally means that there are indefinitely many 
squares and not just that there are indefinitely many nonperfect squares. So, 
Szab6’s translation of 147d3-4 is also off the mark: in the apposition of 
rrspi &IV&.L~~V r~ and 7+s r& rpiv080~ 7~6p~ ~ai ~T.wT&-o~o~, the second phrase 
limits the sense of the first which is more general and not a mere verbal equivalent 
[ 11. Such imprecision ill suits Szab6’s criticism of other translations and his prom- 
ise of philological care in dealing with ancient sources. But more important, it is 
companion to confusion in his account of “dynumis.” Szab6 has no cause in this 
text to distinguish dynumeis and tetrugbnu schkmutu or to claim that Euclid 
prefers “tetrugbnon” as the general term for “square” and avoids “dynumis” 
because it connotes a species of square. So far as I can determine, Szab6 is 
unaware of this: in some places he treats “dynumis” as “square equal in area to a 
rectangle whose sides are not similar numbers”; but in others, as “square” sim- 
pliciter (cf. pp. 63, 65, 66, 96). 
In Part 2 (pp. 99-184), through study of the terms regularly associated with the 
theory of proportions found in Euclid’s Elements, in particular of “logos,” “unul- 
338 REVIEWS HM II 
won, ” and “anafogiu,” Szabo proposes to uncover the origins of this theory in 
Greek science (pp. 99-105). Since ratios (logoi) and proportions (unalogiai) are 
said to hold between terms (horoi), Szabo begins with “horos.” On the ground 
that “horos” signifies either a definition or a terminus, Szabo identifies the primi- 
tive sense of “horos” in proportion theory with “endpoint.” and takes recourse 
to the notion of a musical diaste^mu (interval) in order to show how ratios came to 
be said to have horoi or terms which are whole numbers. 
As Szabo has it, there are three stages in the development of Greek musical 
theory. In the earliest, “diust&nu” referred to the entire length of a string seen as 
an improper fraction of some unit length of string with which it produced the mus- 
ical interval heard. For example, the hemiolion diastBma is the string which is one 
and a half times longer than the string length sounding the fifth above. (The gen- 
eral technique of anthyphairesis supposedly originates in the musical theorists’ at- 
tempt to quantify the relation of the diastbna to the unit length by means of 
reciprocal subtraction.) In the next stage, a monochord was measured into twelve 
parts to accommodate the division of the whole string or diastkmu into halves, 
thirds, and fourths (which yields respectively, the octave, fifth, and fourth, when 
one-half, two-thirds, or three-fourths of the whole string is plucked). Once this 
was done, it became the practice to identify the diuste^ma with the segment of 
string which was not sounded when the monochord was blocked by a movable 
bridge so as to delimit the lesser length which produces the desired interval when 
plucked. Since the endpoints of this diuste^ma were easily read off as numbers, the 
diuste^ma was specified as a relation or ratio of whole numbers and “horos” came 
to designate the numbers in the ratio. Later this diaste^ma was called a logos. In 
the final stage, that is, by the time of the Sectio canonis, the notion of a diuste^ma 
was slightly revised: it came to be viewed not as the unsounded length of the 
monochord but as the two sonant lengths. In short, the numbers defining the 
diaste”ma or logos were no longer taken to be the endpoints of the unsounded 
string length but as the magnitudes of the two string lengths which produced the 
notes in question (pp. 105-144). 
Next, Szabo considers “logos, ’ ’ a project which begins with a study of “una 
logon”l“analogon,” “analogos,” and “unalogia.” As he argues, at some point 
in the sixth century B.C., mathematicians coined “ana logon” (later written as 
one word) as an ellipsis of “anu logon isoilisa” and understood this phrase to 
mean “equal when taken in ratios or ratio by ratio” (the preposition “ana” being 
used distributively). Thus, “anulogia” designates the property of sameness which 
quanta unu logon possess. By classical times, Szabo suggests, “analogon” was 
no longer limited to a group of at least four quanta two pairs of which defined the 
same ratio, but was applied to each one of the four quanta as well. Such usage 
facilitated the creation of the adjective analogos. In the same period, it became 
customary to use such phrases as “ton auton logon echonta” instead of “anulo- 
gon” for “in the same ratio.” So far, Szabo has concentrated on mathematics, in 
which “logos” means “ratio.” Now he discerns an earlier sense of “logos” 
which is peculiar to musical theory. He proposes that the desire to compare 
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diuste*mata (line segments, ratios) occasioned the introduction of “logos,” a term 
used in everyday language to designate a series or combination of objects or 
numbers, in the related but novel sense, “any pair of numbers forming the end- 
points of the diastkma.” At this point, a logos, he argues, was any kind of relation 
between two numbers and “analogia” just meant “equality of pairs of numbers.” 
Thus, “diastema” and “logos” were not yet synonymous. Later, however, when 
the theory of proportion was extended to arithmetic and geometry, “logos” came 
to mean “ratio of two numbers.” For, as Szabo conjectures, the ambiguity of 
“diastkma” (“straight line, ” “ratio”) was especially confusing in geometry and 
so it was decided to reserve “diast&ma” for “straight line” and to designate a 
ratio by “logos.” This, of course, required a corresponding revision in the use of 
“analogia” (pp. 144-170). 
This concludes the demonstration that the basic terms and concepts of the 
theory of proportion have their origins in the theory of music. In the remainder of 
Part 2, Szabo undertakes to show that the extension of these terms and concepts 
from music theory first to arithmetic and then to geometry entailed the develop- 
ment of the theory of proportions as we know it, since the notion of equality of 
ratio was much more important in the latter two sciences; and that the problem of 
defining a musical diastt?ma which is exactly half a given interval (i.e., of finding 
the geometric mean of the numerical terms of the ratio expressing the given 
interval), once taken up in arithmetic, may have led to the problem of similarity 
among rectilinear figures and, thus, may have introduced the problem of linear 
incommensurability and the need to define mean proportionals for arbitrary quan- 
tities. Finally, Szabo reconstructs the history of the construction of the mean 
proportional in Euclid, Elements vi 13 (pp. 170-181). 
I have described Part 2 at length because it has not received the same critical 
attention as Part 1 in the general literature, and because it may mislead the unwary 
reader by virtue of the obscurity of its subject. Though his effort to connect a 
variety of issues usually considered in isolation (if at all) is commendable, Szabo’s 
argument is replete with more errors of detail and conception than I can deal with 
here. Of these, the primary difficulty is, I think, his insistence that a horos is a 
terminus or endpoint of a line segment or distance (= diaste^ma). Though it is true 
that a diast@ma in geometry may be a line segment, this cannot be what it is in 
treatises and discussions of musical theory. In such texts, the term has its root 
meaning, “separation” (dia-St&ma: “that which has been made to stand apart” or 
“a standing apart”; cf. sys-st8ma: “that which has been made to stand together,” 
and, in musical theory, “a scale or sequence of intervals”). The separation of two 
quanta may be defined in three ways: as their ratio, as their difference, or as the 
region between them. In the case of musical theory or harmonic science, what 
escapes Szabo is that the quanta studied are not lengths of string but musical 
sounds construed as pitches. In other words, the aim of this science is to explain 
why sound is musical, and to do this it concentrates on the relative pitches of 
melodic sounds: the early Greeks lacked means of establishing criteria of absolute 
pitch or even standard pitch [Bowen 1982, 92-941. Given that the basic explanan- 
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dum of harmonic science is the interval (diaste^ma) of two sounds or pitches and 
its melodic collocation with other intervals in scales and ultimately in music, it 
follows that (i) to identify a diustCma as a logos is to specify the essence of a 
diuste^ma or to define what it really is, and that (ii) harmonic theories could differ 
by taking the separation of two pitches to be either a ratio, a difference, or the 
region between them. All three positions are, in fact, recorded in the fourth 
century B.C.: the first is Pythagorean, the third is that of Aristoxenus (an author 
Szabo clearly misunderstands), and the second may be associated with the prede- 
cessors Aristoxenus criticizes (the two pitches delimiting an interval measured by 
the quarter-tone) [2]. Moreover, it is clear that, when an interval or diaste^ma is 
construed as a logos, the horos of the diastc?ma is not an endpoint of a line 
segment but a relatum, i.e., that which d&es or delimits (horizein) the peculiar 
relation a ratio is. 
Szabo’s reconstruction begins with the false assumption that a musical interval 
is really just a string length. The texts adduced as evidence are unavailing, once 
they are read in their complete form and properly translated [3]. Further, his 
argument is an epistemological muddle. To use the monochord as Szabo requires, 
one must already know what musical intervals are. How can one determine by 
measurement that a difference in pitch such as the perfect fifth is 12:8 or 3:2 unless 
one is already aware of what such fifths sound like [4]? But, if the experience of 
musical intervals is prior to their quantification on the monochord, it is hardly 
credible that one would confuse the difference in sounds which one hears with the 
length(s) of string one observes on a monochord. At any rate, it is clear that the 
Greeks at least did not make this mistake. All the ancient schools of harmonic 
science agreed in taking a musical interval to be essentially a separation of 
pitches. Each treated such separations as magnitudes which, as the ear testifies, 
may be added and subtracted. Of these theorists, the Pythagoreans alone looked 
to the physical causes of the pitches in order to quantify this separation; they 
alone elaborated a detailed account of how sound propagates in order to connect 
the length of sonant strings and pipes with the pitch which is heard. Yet, at no 
point did they confuse the measurement of string lengths and so on with the 
objects of their science, the pitch intervals which are indirectly and relatively 
quantified by such measurement [Bowen 19821. Unlike Szabo the Pythagoreans 
did not regard their science as a study of the monochord. (Szabo’s view is some- 
what better than supposing the science to be of musical instruments, though 1 am 
not sure that he realizes that the archaeological remains of these instruments show 
that their structure bore no obvious relation to the sounds produced on them: the 
strings of the lyre were of the same length and pipes were bored at equal distances 
[A.) 
There is another aspect of Szabo’s argument which is as disturbing as his hasty 
reading of the geometers use of “diaste^ma ” into harmonic theory, and this is his 
willingness to dispense with the ancient testimony in favor of conjectures prefer- 
red on linguistic grounds (pp. I I l-l 12, e.g.). Thus, while Szabo might be per- 
suaded to review his account of “diaste*ma” by the argument that the formation of 
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the word shows its primitive meaning to be “separation,” I doubt, for example, 
that he would be similarly persuaded by the fact that there is a lengthy fragment 
from Archytas’ work on music (late fifth century-early fourth century B.C.) which 
begins with a statement of his debt to ancient predecessors (presumably Pythago- 
rean) and then develops a theory in which the greater number in a musical ratio is 
assigned to the higher note [Bowen 1982, 79-871. For it is a consequence of 
Szabo’s speculation about “diaste^ma” that the original Pythagorean theorists 
associated the larger number with the lower note. 
The focus of Part 3 (pp. 185-329) is the origin and development of the notion of 
proof in Greek mathematics: as Szabo observes, it is in relying on systematic 
demonstration that Greek mathematics is distinguished from its Oriental prede- 
cessors. After reflecting on “deiknumi,” on some passages in Plato and a few 
proofs in Euclid’s Elements, Szabo concludes that, in the earlier stages of Greek 
mathematics, proof consisted in making facts visible and so was quite empirical in 
character, whereas such visual demonstration was later rejected as mathemati- 
cians began to state their arguments more abstractly and employ reductio ad 
absurdum (pp. 185-199). Szabo connects this transition with the discovery of 
linear incommensurability, since the proof that magnitudes are incommensurable, 
i.e., that there exists no common measure of two magnitudes, necessarily belongs 
to theory and not to practice. Moreover, on the ground that there is no way to 
explain in terms of earlier mathematics itself the transition from empiricism to the 
conjunction of anti-empiricism and indirect proof, and because anti-empiricism is 
not always conjoined with indirect proof as it is in the earliest demonstration of 
the incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of the square (App. 27 to 
Euclid, Efem. x), Szab6 looks to external influence, in particular, to the Eleatics, 
Parmenides and Zeno, for whom this conjunction is a necessary and essential 
feature of their philosophizing (pp. 199-220). 
To establish the importance of the Eleatics, Szabo concentrates on the question 
as to how the Greeks came to organize science as a set of propositions derived 
from undemonstrated first principles. Szabo begins by arguing that Aristotle is not 
responsible for this systematization of science. After a study of “hypothesis” in 
Euclid’s Elements and Plato’s dialogues, he proposes that Parmenides was the 
first to use indirect proof and that his disciple, Zeno, was the first to use this 
method systematically to examine propositions: if the consequences of a proposi- 
tion (called a hypothesis) are contradictory, the antithesis is thereby established; 
whereas, if they are not, the hypothesis is secured as a starting point for knowl- 
edge of what follows from it. This method of testing hypotheseis or ad hoc assump- 
tions in dialectic was taken over by the mathematicians, who retained this usage 
of “hypothesis” (“assumption”), though they later narrowed its meaning to “(un- 
demonstrated) first principle (which entails no contradictions)” as well as to “defi- 
nition.” To connect the mathematicians’ anti-empiricism with the dependence of 
their terminology and technique on Eleatic thought, Szabo notes that the use of 
indirect proof in dialectic and in science presupposes the rejection of sense percep- 
tion: the criterion of consistency is purely theoretical or abstract. As for the 
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restriction of “hypothesis” to “first principle” and “definition,” he suggests that 
those ad hoc assumptions which proved necessary for every mathematical investi- 
gation were treated as first principles, and that these were, as a matter of course, 
definitions. Thus, in his view. mathematics owes its abstractness, its method of 
indirect proof, and its very foundations to the Eleatics (pp. 220-257). 
The remainder of Part 3 elaborates the dependence of Greek mathematics on 
Eleatic teaching. For Szabo. the theory of number preserved in Elements vii-ix 
merely extends and modifies the Eleatic conception of the One (pp. 257-267). He 
also contends that not only do the terms for the trichotomy of the undemonstrated 
first principles in Euclid’s Elements (that is, of definitions, postulates, and axioms) 
originate in Zenonian dialectic, many of the particular principles Euclid records 
do as well (pp. 268-304). The story for geometry is somewhat different. As Szabo 
tells it, ancient geometry is a science of space; accordingly, when the Eleatics 
denied the existence of space, they treated geometry as a study based solely on 
sense perception. After considering passages from Plato’s Republic and Timaeus, 
Szabo argues that the geometers responded to the Eleatic denial of the real exis- 
tence and intelligibility of space by claiming that space is not a sensible phenome- 
non but an eternal, indestructible object independent of phenomena and reached 
by abstraction from them. This new understanding of space was not without 
difficulty (e.g., its unlimited divisibility; the need for what the Eleatics rejected, 
motion, to define basic figures) and, Szabo concludes, it is in response to this that 
geometers were led to devise axiomatic foundations, a development which en- 
couraged and perhaps even fostered the systematic organization of the other 
branches of mathematics (pp. 304-3 17). On pp. 317-329, Szab6 addresses some 
remarks to the problem of mathematical existence and how it is demonstrated, 
and to the issue of Plato’s purported role in the reform of mathematics. 
There is much in Part 3 to provoke thought but even more which calls forth easy 
refutation. Any reader of Plato, Republic 509dI-51 ld6 and 533bl-534b2 will find 
ample reason. I think, to reject Szabo’s assertion that irrroriz!Jrcrz?a~ means “to 
determine” or “to give a definition” rather than just “to posit” (p. 224); his 
assumption that, for the ancients, what is not visible is in the mind (i.e., that 
classical mathematics was an analysis of concepts); his claim that Greek geometry 
is a science of space rather than of figure; and his contention that geometry was 
held to differ from arithmetic in its being less abstract and more reliant on percep- 
tion [6]. As for Szabo’s thesis that Greek mathematics developed as a response to 
the Eleatics, one should distinguish mathematical research and the organization of 
this research. Now the relevant texts can be taken to show that even in the earliest 
stages this research is independent of philosophical influence [Knorr 19821. The 
case for the development of argumentative form in mathematics is likewise prob- 
lematic. For it must be said that, according to the literary evidence, the classifica- 
tion of first principles and how they serve in demonstrations was relatively unso- 
phisticated in the early fourth century; that the occasion for much of the 
development in this classification was the rather “Parmenidean” interpretation of 
geometry in Plato’s Republic vi-vii and the subsequent objection to this by 
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Menaechmus, a mathematician who became in effect the proponent of the geome- 
ters’ understanding of their science; and that the later Platonist defense of what 
Plato said had no effect on how mathematicians responded to the organizational 
questions which Menaechmus’ opposition raised [Bowen 19831. Szab6’s argument 
that “hypothesis,” “axibma,” and “aite^ma” derive from dialectic is promis- 
ing, but a much broader study of Greek literature (e.g., that of the sophists and 
forensic orators) as well of Greek science should perhaps be undertaken before 
allowing his contention that dialectic has its roots in Eleatic thought: after all, 
Aristotle’s claim that Zeno is the founder of dialectic may mean no more than 
that he was the first to use dialectical techniques to establish systematically a philo- 
sophical position [Allen 1983, 67-9 11. 
The book ends with a Postscript (pp. 330-331), an Appendix (pp. 332-353) 
attacking the view that Euclid, Elem. ii 5 and 6 belong to Greek geometrical 
algebra, an Index of Names, and a Subject Index. 
As Szab6 declares in the Introduction, this book is not for the general reader but 
for the specialist. Yet the specialist will, I expect, find it useful only for the range 
of questions that it raises: Szab6’s perseverence in seeking connections between 
different sciences is impressive and, as a record of issues to be considered, the 
book is indeed valuable and rewards study. But, as argument and interpretation, 
the book has the weakness of its strength: it simply raises more questions than the 
author is truly prepared to answer. Thus, while the book affords isolated insights 
of interest, overall, neither Szab6’s results nor his method sustain scrutiny. It is 
unfortunate as well that what utility the book has is diminished by the omission of 
an index of passages cited and a bibliography, and by the fact that Szab6 has failed 
to unite the eighteen or so papers which he utilizes into a coherent whole: the 
exposition is at times oblique, digressive, and repetitive. 
A word about the production of the book. It is indeed rare to read a text so 
poorly presented. The errors in printing are beyond counting; the references in the 
footnotes are not standardized and, what is worse, they are frequently incorrect. 
All of which needlessly detracts from what Szab6 has accomplished. 
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NOTES 
1. McDowell renders 147d3-4 as “Theodorus here was drawing diagrams to show us something 
about powers-namely that a square of three square feet and one of five square feet . .” [McDowell 
1973, 91 and so captures the relation between the two phrases, although what he translates by 
“powers” (dynameis) is, as Szab6 maintains, properly read as “squares” [Bumyeat 1978, 495-4991. 
2. The three theories are recounted in Porphyry, In Harm. 90.24-95.23. 1 have discussed this 
passage and others relevant to it elsewhere [Bowen 1985, Ch. 1, 61. Andrew Barker’s account of the 
non-Pythagorean theorists whom Aristoxenus criticizes should be consulted [Barker 19781. 
3. I shall have to limit my criticism to one example, and trust that is sufficient to warn others to 
exercise caution and scepticism when Szab6 confronts them with Greek text and translation. On p. 
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1 IO, Szabo gives a highly colored reading of Philolaus Fragment 6: the text actually says only “The 
magnitude of the octave is a fourth and a fifth, and the fifth is larger than the fourth by a sesquioctave 
interval. For, from the hypare to the m& is a fourth; from the mesh to the n;fP. a fifth; from the nPfP to 
the frite?, a fourth: and from the frife^ to the hypafe^, a fifth; and the interval in between the mese^ and frifC 
is the sesquioctave; the fourth is the sesquitertiate interval; the fifth, the sesquialterate; and the octave. 
the duple . .” [Diels and Kranz 1951, 1.409-4101. There is, of course, no use of “distance” in the 
account of the separations of the sounds named hypare^, me&, and so on. Moreover, though the names 
for the sounds referred to in this fragment may derive in part from musical practice (the hypatC and 
ndt@ get their names from the relative positions of the strings as the instrument is held by the per- 
former), the archaeological evidence does not encourage confidence that the other names do as well. 
On the structure of instruments, see below. At any rate, it should be clear that the fragment is concerned 
with scale structure, i.e., with collocations of musical intervals or pitch separations, and that, while the 
pitches defining the intervals are, I submit. easily regarded as lengths, this fragment is obviously 
devoted to the view tha; the intervals themselves are not: otherwise, they could not be identified as 
ratios [Porphyry, In Harm. 90.24-95.231. 
4. Such a consideration also threatens Szabo’s assumption that the musical ratios were actually 
discovered by experimentation on strings. If the awareness of what the intervals sound like is prior, the 
variety in acuteness of hearing and in accuracy of measurement would almost guarantee that the 
results obtained in given trials would not be 2:1, 3:2, and 4:3, for the least concords, respectively. 
Since there is no evidence that such values were assigned on a statistical basis, it must follow that they 
were chosen in light of other considerations. 
5. [Bowen 1985, Ch. 3, notes 142-1481. Schlesinger’s argument that the musical ratios were discov- 
ered on the aulos is unconvincing, but her analysis of the extant uu/oi is valuable [Schlesinger 19391. 
6. Szabo’s also uses Republic 525d5-526b4 as evidence that Plato shared with Euclid the view that 
number is a plurality of units. This passage, however, is better taken as evidence that Plato interpreted 
contemporary arithmeticians to hold that each number is an indivisible unit [Cherniss 1944, 126 and 
513-524; Cherniss 1947, 238, note 791. 
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Reviewed by Stillman Drake 
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The arithmetical and algebraic section of Chuquet’s Triparty was published a 
century ago. The present volume contains the geometrical section, called “geom- 
etry” by the author and described in the editor’s subtitle as “algebraic geometry.” 
The text used is that of a manuscript copied only four years before the author’s 
death, here taken as the definitive version. A less complete manuscript copy about 
ten years earlier also is extant. No part of the Triparty was published until 1880, 
although extracts from it were printed by Etienne de la Roche in his arithmetic of 
1520 (reprinted 1538) without identification of their authorship. 
Chuquet’s algebraic contributions are noteworthy for their implications in the 
expanding concept of “number” before Stevin’s invention of decimal fractions in 
1585; for his method of approximation to irrationals by insertion between rationals 
a/b and c/d of (a + b)l(c + d); and for notations facilitating calculation with 
negative numbers and exponents. Also significant is Chuquet’s step toward equa- 
tional form by his attention to the case of equality and by his emphasis on the 
importance of the recognition of equivalent expressions. A convenient summary 
of the previously published part of La Geometrie was given by J. Itard in the 
article “Chuquet” (Dictionary of ScientiJc Biography iii, pp. 272-278). 
The phrase “algebraic geometry” (found in the subtitle of this volume), as 
applied to writings before Descartes, does not mean analytic geometry; its mean- 
ing varies so widely with the state of the art as to convey information only in that 
context. Until the sixteenth century algebra consisted largely of techniques of 
calculation applied mainly to numerical approximations of irrationals or to ele- 
mentary Diophantine solutions. Accordingly, in this volume “algebraic geome- 
try” refers to numerical determinations of area or volume. In that respect Chu- 
quet’s Geometry is a treatise on mensuration in a tradition extending back to the 
Alexandrian era, and thence to early Babylonian and Egyptian mathematical trea- 
tises. 
The text is reproduced exactly, with minimal editorial adjustments, as fully 
explained in the Introduction. The printed diagrams are drawings from the origi- 
